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Localized or Generalized Growth? 
Structural Breaks and the Two Views of the Industrial 
Revolution 
Alvaro S. Pereira ∗ 
Abstract: »Lokalisiertes oder generalisiertes Wachstum? Strukturelle Umbrü-
che und die zwei Sichtweisen der industriellen Revolution«. This paper uses an 
endogenous structural breaks procedure that provides additional evidence on 
two alternative views of the British Industrial Revolution. The tests are carried 
out for two periods: 1750-1800 and 1800-1850. The empirical results show that 
structural breaks occurred in most British industries throughout the period, 
suggesting that growth was pervasive and not localized in the iron and cotton 
industries. Growth accelerated in most industries throughout the period, which 
indicates an increasing dynamism of the British economy.  
Keywords: Industrial Revolution, structural breaks. 
1. Introduction 
Although its long-term consequences are indisputable, there is still widespread 
debate on whether or not the Industrial Revolution represented a major discon-
tinuity in the process of British economic development. Deane and Cole (1969) 
suggest that the Industrial Revolution was a period in which there was a sharp 
acceleration in economic growth. In contrast, the pioneering studies of Crafts 
and Harley (Harley 1982, Crafts 1985, Crafts and Harley 1992) indicate that 
GDP growth was slow during the early Industrial Revolution and total factor 
productivity (TFP) grew very gradually1. The Crafts and Harley estimates also 
suggest that output and productivity growth accelerated only in a couple of 
“dynamic” industries (cotton and iron), implying that innovation and growth 
were localized in these industries. According to them, outside these sectors, the 
British economy was still dominated by small-scale industries that were charac-
terized by low productivity and lack of innovation. 
                                                             
∗  Address all communications to: Alvaro S. Pereira, School for International Studies, Simon 
Fraser University Vancouver, 515 West Hastings Street, Vancouver, BC, V6B 5K3, Can-
ada; e-mail: apereira@sfu.ca.  
1  Deane and Cole (1969) estimate that output and industrial growth rates accelerated from 
less than 1 percent per year to a staggering 3.4 percent in the 1780s. Crafts and Harley 
(1992) estimate that GDP growth increased from 0.6 per cent per year before 1780 to 1.4 
percent from 1780-1800 and to 1.9 percent between 1800 and 1830. According to them, 
TFP grew at an average of 0.1 percent per year before 1800 and around 0.3 percent from 
1800 to 1830. 
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In contrast, opponents of the gradualist view, such as Berg (1994), Berg and 
Hudson (1992) and Esteban (1994), have claimed that the macro estimates 
suffer from a series of flaws2, which imply that the Crafts-Harley estimates 
might underestimate output and productivity growth, but also might entail an 
unnecessary homogenization of a diverse and dynamic economy. In his classic 
work on technological change, Mokyr (1990) has also indicated that innovation 
seems to have been pervasive during the Industrial Revolution. In spite of these 
criticisms, during the last two decades the pendulum of research on the Indus-
trial Revolution seems to have swung increasingly in the favor of the gradual-
ists. The Industrial Revolution appears to be losing its revolutionary character, 
being now pictured as just a non-exceptional growth spurt caused by the “local-
ized” growth of the textile and iron industries (Clark 2001, Goldstone 2002). 
In the last few years, these two views of the Industrial Revolution have been 
assessed in a variety of ways. By analyzing trade flows between Britain and the 
rest of the world, Temin (1997, 2000) presents evidence in favour of general-
ized industrial growth, showing that British exports included products from 
both the dynamic and traditional sectors, such as paper, soap, and woollen 
goods. In contrast, Harley and Crafts (2000) use a CGE model in which the 
exports of the traditional industries increase even in the absence of TFP 
growth. According to them, the rise in the volume of exports of the most tradi-
tional sectors can be explained by the need to finance increasing food imports 
(fuelled by rapid population growth), the quality of the British goods and a 
poor substitutability of other countries’ goods. In turn, Greasley and Oxley 
(2000) pursue an alternative approach by analysing the properties of time series 
of industrial output data in a sample of 26 industries obtained from Walther 
Hoffmann (1955) during the 1815-1860 period. They conclude that early indus-
trialization was defined by a small number of stochastic common trends. 
Granger-type causality tests also suggest that cotton textiles and iron products 
(and possibly sugar) were the leading sectors in British industrial growth. 
Greasley and Oxley thus propose an intermediate position between the two 
views of the Industrial Revolution, in which several technological waves 
spread across the British economy with different impact on individual indus-
tries.  
This paper also exploits the properties of disaggregated time series in order 
to compare the two views of the Industrial Revolution. In this context, this 
study uses an econometric technique recently developed by Vogelsang (1997) 
that endogenously searches for structural breaks of disaggregated time series. 
The results of the Vogelsang structural breaks tests provide additional evidence 
on the localized versus generalized growth controversy, allowing us to see 
                                                             
2  Including data unreliability, the difficulty in assigning accurate weights to the several 
sectors of the economy, wide regional disparities, the reliance on adult male data, and the 
difficulty of estimating non-factory production. 
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whether or not structural breaks were restricted to the cotton and iron industries 
(and hence growth was localized). The results of the Vogelsang structural 
breaks tests provide additional evidence supporting the view that industrial 
growth was not localized the Industrial Revolution and that output growth 
accelerated across most industrial sectors throughout the period. The results 
from the Vogelsang tests also provide additional information about the statisti-
cal properties of the British historical industrial statistics. In this sense, this 
paper extends the pioneering work made by Crafts and Mills (1994, 2004) and 
by Greasley and Oxley (1994, 2000) on British historical time series during the 
Industrial Revolution. The results in this paper show that, similarly to the find-
ings related to the aggregate industrial indexes, most individual industrial time 
series also exhibit structural breaks. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the Vogelsang structural 
breaks tests and presents results for two periods, 1700-1800 and 1800-1850. 
Section 3 reports the results from the estimation of the impulse response func-
tions, and the last section concludes. 
2. Structural Breaks and the Two Views of the Industrial 
Revolution 
Testing for structural breaks in the context of the British Industrial Revolution 
is not a completely novel approach. Namely, Crafts and Mills (2000, 1994) 
found that an aggregate index of industrial output followed a segmented quad-
ratic trend and had breaks occurring in 1776 and in 1831. However, similar 
tests have not been carried out in disaggregated data, especially at the sector 
level. This paper tries to remedy this lacuna by testing for structural breaks in a 
plethora of industrial time series as well as other variables such as trade and 
patent series.  
The work by Crafts and Mills and the estimates of Crafts and Harley (1992) 
both suggest that the growth process of the British economy after the mid-
eighteen century was not smooth: aggregate growth increased in the last dec-
ades of that century, and then it accelerated further in the early nineteenth cen-
tury, decelerating afterwards. These estimates based on aggregated industrial 
data seem to indicate that there were (at least) two possible structural breaks 
during the Industrial Revolution. Based on these studies, and in order to sim-
plify the analysis, the period of analysis was divided into two broad sub-
periods: 1750-1800 and 1800-18503. This subdivision of the time series is 
necessary because the Vogelsang tests described below are only able to detect a 
                                                             
3  Tests were performed for other sub-periods but did not significantly change the results 
obtained. 
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single break. Hence, if there were multiple breaks, the Vogelsang test would 
pick up the most likely break, but not other less significant ones. 
The hypothesis to be tested is the following: if the “localized” growth hy-
pothesis is correct, then: 1) in the period before 1800, we should be able to 
detect structural breaks only in the most dynamic sectors (cotton and iron) of 
the British economy, and 2) most industrial series should exhibit a structural 
break after 1830 (i.e. the period when, according to some gradualists4, modern 
growth emerges). On the other hand, if the “generalized growth” view is cor-
rect, then most series should exhibit breaks in their trends in both periods, 
which implies that most industries were subject to structural transformations 
throughout the Industrial Revolution. 
Data were obtained from a variety of sources. Most industrial output data 
are from Hoffmann’s (1995) work on British industrial growth. Many series in 
the Hoffmann data start in early eighteen century, and the Hoffmann indices 
contain not only disaggregated data for several industries, but also other impor-
tant variables, such as the number of bankruptcies, an index of consumer 
goods, and an index of producer goods. Some other variables (e.g. beer, steel, 
shipbuilding, etc.) start only at the end of the eighteenth century or after 1800. 
The Hoffmann data were chosen because they still provide the best source of 
disaggregated data of the British Industrial Revolution (Greasley and Oxley 
2000). In addition to the Hoffmann data, Feinstein’s (1988) pig iron output data 
are also used, as well as the number of patents collected by Dutton (1984) and 
MacLeod (1988), total exports and imports as reported in Mitchell (1988), and 
the Crafts-Harley (1992) total industrial output indexes. All in all, for the pe-
riod 1750-1800, we have 16 industrial series, 6 aggregate indexes and 5 other 
variables (including bankruptcies, exports, imports, and patents), whereas for 
the period 1800-1850 there are 30 individual industries as well as 11 other 
series. 
The Vogelsang SupWald Tests 
In order to test for structural changes in each individual series, the SupWald (or 
SupFt) Vogelsang test was selected due to its advantages in comparison to other 
tests for structural breaks, and because it provides endogenous estimates of the 
structural break date without specifying a priori the break years5. In previous 
tests for structural breaks, some restrictions (e.g. non-trending regressors, sta-
tionarity, and no serial correlation) were relaxed, but not all simultaneously. In 
contrast, the Vogelsang SupWald procedure is a test for a structural break in 
                                                             
4  See, for instance, Clark (2001) and Goldstone (2002). 
5  These tests were also carried out by Ben-David and Papell (1995, 1997) for GDP and 
export and import ratios. 
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the trend function of a univariate time series, which allows for serial correlation 
and is robust in the presence of a unit root. The features of this test are impor-
tant for this paper, since most series analyzed have trends, exhibit serial corre-
lation, and have unit roots. According to the methodology developed by Vogel-
sang (1997) and Perron (1989), the tests are divided into two stages. In the first 
stage, Phillips-Perron unit root tests are performed. These results are reported 
in table 1.  
Table 1: Phillips-Perron unit roots tests, 1750-1850 
 1750-1800 1800-1850
 t-stat P-value6 t-stat P-value 
 Industries     
 Beer   -3.259 0.085 
 Breads and cakes   -4.439* 0.005 
 Building   -0.155 0.992 
 Coal -5.448* 0.000 -0.552 0.978 
 Copper -3.425 0.068 -2.755 0.220 
 Copper Ore -2.134 0.518 -2.223 0.467 
 Cotton goods 1.015 1.000 -2.535 0.311 
 Cotton yarn 0.180 0.998 -2.170 0.495 
 Flour   -3.985* 0.016 
 Hemp products   -5.474* 0.000 
 Iron (Feinstein) 2.501 1.000 0.270 0.998 
 Iron (Hoffmann)   -1.456 0.832 
 Iron and steel products   -1.665 0.752 
 Leather   -3.854* 0.022 
 Leather goods   -3.724* 0.030 
 Linen yarn -3.309 0.079 -5.086* 0.001 
 Linens -3.318 0.078 -5.730* 0.000 
 Malt -7.325* 0.000 -5.791* 0.000 
 Ocean shipping -1.181 0.904 0.601 0.999 
 Paper -2.593 0.285 -0.047 0.995 
 Shipbuilding   -2.883 0.177 
 Silk goods   -5.624* 0.000 
 Silk thread   -5.099* 0.001 
 Spirits   -2.613 0.277 
 Steel   -1.370 0.858 
                                                             
6  MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values. The Phillips-Perron test critical values are, – 
4.0524(1% level), - 3.455 (5% level), and –3.153 (10% level).  
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Table 1 continued… 
 Sugar -5.984* 0.000 -3.448 0.056 
 Tin -6.484* 0.000 -3.001 0.142 
 Tobacco   -2.520 0.318 
 Woollen cloth -3.185 0.097 -5.418* 0.000 
 Woollen yarn -2.885 0.187 -4.546* 0.003 
 Aggregate indexes     
 Consumer goods -0.325 0.989 -2.832 0.193 
 Producer goods 0.523 0.999 -0.117 0.993 
 Total Industry (Hoffmann) 4.717* 1.000 2.628 1.000 
 Total Industry (Hoffmann 2) 0.732 0.999 -1.387 0.853 
 Total Industry  
 (Crafts and Harley 1) 
-3.140 0.103 -1.643 0.762 
 Total Industry  
 (Crafts and Harley 2) 
-1.194 0.906 -1.566 0.792 
 Miscellaneous Variables     
 Bankruptcies -5.285* 0.000 -4.614* 0.003 
 Patents (Hoffmann) -3.490* 0.046 -0.456 0.985 
 Patents (MacLeod) -3.512* 0.044 -2.234 0.461 
 Exports 1.548 1.000 -3.787 0.025 
 Imports 5.644* 1.000 -3.812 0.022 
* reject unit root at the 5% level of significance 
This is an important stage of the Vogelsang tests, because the critical values 
depend on whether the series is stationary or contains a unit root. For the 1750-
1800 period, we can reject the null of a unit root for 4 out of 16 industrial se-
ries, as well as 6 out of 11 of the remaining series. For 1800-1850, the null can 
be rejected for 12 out of 30 industries and 1 out of 11 of the other series. Al-
though tests for unit roots in these series have a strong tendency to reject the 
unit root hypothesis, we erred on the side of caution and always used the unit 
root critical values due to the low power of these tests. The use of the unit root 
critical values changes little. All but 3 of the 68 series tested did not exhibit a 
structural change as a consequence of using the unit root critical values. In the 
second stage of the Vogelsang procedure, the following equations are esti-
mated: 
yt = μ + βt + δt2 + θDUt + γ1 DTt + γ2 DT2t + 
jt
k
1j
j yc −
=
∑
 + εt  (1) 
yt = μ + βt + θDUt + γDTt + 
jt
k
1j
j yc −
=
∑
 + εt    (2) 
yt = μ + θDUt + 
jt
k
1j
j yc −
=
∑
 + εt     (3) 
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where yt represents the series to be tested, TB denotes the time of the break 
or the period at which the change in the parameters of the trend function oc-
curs, t represents a linear trend, and t2 denotes the square of this linear trend. 
Following Ng and Perron (1995) and Perron (1989), the general-to-specific 
data dependent method for selecting the lag length k is used: start with k*=8 
and if the t-statistic on γj was greater than 1.6 in absolute value k was set to 8, if 
not, the last lag was removed and the test repeated. In addition, the break 
dummy variables have the following values: DUt =1 if t > TB, zero otherwise; 
DTt = t-TB if t > TB, zero otherwise; and DT2t = (t-TB)2 if t > TB, zero other-
wise7. Each model is then estimated sequentially for each possible break year 
with 1 percent trimming, i.e., for 0.01T < TB<0.99T, where T is the number of 
observations. In Model (1), SupWald is the maximum, over all possible trend 
breaks, of three times the standard F-statistic for testing θ = γ1 = γ2 = 0. In 
Model (2), SupWald is the maximum, over all possible trend breaks, of two 
times the standard F-statistic for testing θ = γ = 0. Finally, in Model (3), Sup-
Wald is the maximum, over all possible trend breaks, of the standard F-statistic 
for testing θ = 0. In each model, the null hypothesis of no structural change is 
rejected if SupWald is greater than the critical value.  
Intuitively, the existence of structural breaks in the time series y would indi-
cate that the Industrial Revolution led to significant changes in y, originating a 
break in the trend of that series. For instance, if the Vogelsang tests are able to 
reject the null of no structural change for, say, industrial output, then we can be 
confident that, within the relevant significance interval, the trend of industrial 
output has undergone a structural transformation after the break occurred. 
Comparing the pre- and post-break trend growth rates allow us to measure the 
magnitude of the change in the trend. 
Results 
Table 2 summarizes the results of the Vogelsang tests for the 1750-1800 pe-
riod. In terms of model selection, Model I is the preferred specification for 15 
out of the 27 series. More significantly, if we use the unit root critical values, 
the hypothesis of no structural break can be rejected for all series but copper, 
coal, and both patent series. If we use the stationary critical values, both patent 
series also exhibit a structural break in 1792. All structural breaks but ocean 
shipping occur in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, suggesting that 
industrial growth was undergoing significant structural changes across most 
industrial sectors during the early stages of the Industrial Revolution.  
                                                             
7  For the ADF tests, the asymptotic critical values for the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are, respec-
tively -3.571, -2.922 and -2.599 For the KPSS tests, the asymptotic critical values for the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels are, respectively, 0.216, 0.146 and 0.119. 
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Table 2: SupWald values and break years (1750-1800)8 
 
Break 
Year 
ModelSupWaldSignif. Pre-break trend 
growth 
Post-break-trend 
growth 
Industries  
Building 1792 I 42.28 1% 1.5 0.8 
Coal No break - - - - - 
Copper No break - - - - - 
Copper Ore 1787 II 23.13 10% 3.3 4.5 
Cotton goods 1792 I 64.5 1% 5.7 8.5 
Cotton yarn 1781 I 63.97 1% 3.1 7.9 
Iron (Feinstein) 1790 I 61.26 1% 1.7 8.1 
Linens 1781 II 39.37 1% 1.2 2.4 
Linen yarn 1781 II 39.18 1% 1.2 2.3 
Malt 1798 II 23.11 10% 0.05 -3.7 
Ocean shipping 1757 I 34.94 5% -3.9 2.7 
Paper 1777 I 61.11 1% 1.4 1.7 
Sugar 1797 I 40.28 1% 1.4 8.4 
Tin 1783 I 38.35 1% 0.1 0.3 
Woollen cloth 1773 I 33.31 5% 0.6 1.6 
Aggregate indexes  
Consumer goods 1788 II 65.56 1% 1.3 2.3 
Producer goods 1772 I 84.89 1% 1.6 2 
Total Industry  
(Hoffmann) 
1780 I 406.38 1% 1 3.4 
Total Industry  
(Hoffmann 2) 
1788 II 89.52 1% 1.3 2.5 
Total Industry  
(Crafts and Harley 1) 
1773 II 53.48 1% 0.7 1.7 
Total Industry  
(Crafts and Harley 2) 
1773 I 33.99 5% 0.8 1.6 
Miscellaneous Vari-
ables  
Bankruptcies 1792 I 76.71 1% 2.2 -4.9 
Patents (Hoffmann) No break - - - - - 
Patents (MacLeod) 1792 II 17.46 - - - 
Exports 1781 I 34.79 5% -0.03 5.3 
Imports 1784 I 131.84 1% 1.3 5.5 
 
                                                             
8  For Model 1, the critical values or the 1, 5, and 10 percent significance are 38.35, 31.29, 
and 27.99 in the unit root case, respectively. For Model 2, the critical values for the 1, 5, 
and 10 percent significance are respectively, 30.36, 25.1, and 22.29.  
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In terms of the industrial data, the most significant result of the Vogelsang 
tests is that, for the majority of the series analysed, the post-break trend growth 
is higher than the pre-break trend growth. As expected, the highest rates of 
post-break trend growth in the sample occurred in the most dynamic sectors, 
cotton goods (8.5%), cotton yarn (7.9%) and iron (8.1%), but also in the sugar 
industry (8.4%)9. However, for most other series, there is also an acceleration 
in trend growth rates after the structural breaks occurred: from 3.3% to 4.5% in 
copper ore, from 1.2% to 2.4% in linens, from 1.2% to 2.3% in linen yarn, from 
1.4% to 1.7% in the paper industry, from 0.1% to 0.3% in the tin industry, and 
from 0.6% to 1.6% in the woollen cloth industry. The exceptions to this general 
tendency of trend growth acceleration occurred in the building industry (from 
1.5% to 0.8%), and the malt industry (from 0.05% to –3.7%). For the building 
industry, the decline in trend growth rates reflect the 1790s downturn that oc-
curred in this sector, as reported by the classic work of Cairncross and Weber 
(1956).  
All in all, the results of table 2 show that during the Industrial Revolution 
growth accelerated in most industries following the structural breaks, which 
suggests an increasing dynamism of the British economy during the early In-
dustrial Revolution. More importantly, the structural breaks were not confined 
to iron and cotton, which seems to suggest that growth was generalized and 
accelerating across most British industrial sectors. 
The aggregate indexes also show that trend acceleration occurred during the 
early Industrial Revolution. Trend growth rates of consumer goods increased 
from 1.3% to 2.3% after 1788, whereas trend growth of producer goods in-
creased from 1.6% to 2% after 1772. The distinct results of the two aggregate 
industrial output indexes reflect the different weighting procedures of Hoff-
mann (1955) and Crafts and Harley (1992). In both total industry series there is 
an acceleration of trend growth rates, although this increase is much more 
pronounced in the Hoffmann series (from 1% to 3.4%) than in the Crafts-
Harley series (from 0.7% to 1.7%). In addition, the number of bankruptcies 
peaked in the last decade of the 18th century, but then steadily declined after 
1792. Since there was no significant change in the British bankruptcy laws 
until the 19th century, this structural break in the number of bankruptcies likely 
reveals that many “start-ups” of the emerging factory system were not success-
ful. This evidence is consistent with the findings of Atkseon and Kehoe (1997), 
who show that major technological breakthroughs are often associated with 
large-scale experimentation by start-up firms leading to high bankruptcy rates. 
                                                             
9  Pre- and post trend growth rates were found by estimating the following regression: log Yt 
= β0 + β1 Trend + εt, where Yt is series Y at time T, and Trend is a linear time trend. This 
simple method enables us to have an estimation of trend growth rates before and after the 
breaks occur. For an alternative approach that entails the estimation of smooth transition 
estimates of growth rates, see, for instance, Crafts and Mills (2004). 
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In terms of foreign trade, total imports underwent a structural break in 1784, 
after which trend growth accelerated from 1.3% to 5.5%, whereas total exports 
had a structural break in 1781 and trend growth increased from –0.03 % to 
5.3%. In terms of patents, Sullivan (1989) previously found that there was a 
structural break in the number of patents in 1754. The Vogelsang tests for both 
the Hoffmann and the Dutton-MacLeod patent series suggest that there was 
another more prominent break during the early Industrial Revolution, which 
occurred in 1791. The trend growth rate in patents increased after the break 
from 3.5% to 5.5%. These breaks in patents cannot be explained by any change 
in the patent laws, because the British patent system was not substantially 
reformed until 1852 (although there was a minor reform in 1835). Hence, the 
breaks in patents are consistent with the signs of emerging capitalism (as 
MacLeod (1988) claimed) or by a rise in the rewards offered to inventors. That 
is, during the Industrial Revolution more people started using the formal sys-
tem of invention, and the patent system became an institutionalized mechanism 
of protecting property rights10. Since the two “dynamic” sectors (cotton and 
iron) only provided 11 percent of the total number of patents, these findings 
suggest that either pervasive innovation or the signs of emerging capitalism 
were also taking place in the “traditional” sectors of the British economy. 
All in all, most series analyzed exhibited significant structural breaks during 
the last quarter of the eighteenth century. Although the highest trend growth 
rates occurred in the cotton, iron, and sugar industries, there was also trend 
growth acceleration for the great majority of the other industries. Thus, the 
findings of the Vogelsang tests show that structural breaks were pervasive in 
the British industry, and hence growth was not solely “localized” in cotton and 
iron. In this context, cotton and iron seem to have been leading sectors in an 
environment of increasing dynamism all across the British industrial sectors, as 
suggested by Mokyr’s (1990) survey of technological change and by the time 
series evidence presented by Greasley and Oxley (2000). 
                                                             
10  Much innovation was also happening outside the formal patent system (Dutton 1984, 
MacLeod 1988, Mantoux 1961). Some inventors favored secrecy, others did not find it 
worthwhile protecting their innovations, and there were still others who found that “collec-
tive invention” was preferable to patent protection (Allen 1989). Reliable figures on this 
“informal” patent system would likely increase the trend growth acceleration in patents. 
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Post-Break Trend Growth Rates, 1750-1800 
 
1800-1850 
The results for the period 1800-1850 are summarized in Table 3. For most 
series, model I is again the preferred specification. Model II is the preferred 
specification for 9 series (malt, paper, sugar, producer goods, total industry 
Crafts-Harley and imports), whereas model III is the preferred specification for 
3 series (malt, wool, and marriages). Second, the structural breaks occur 
throughout the whole 1800-1850 period, although they cluster slightly after the 
1830s (figure 2). Third, contrary to the period 1750-1800, there is no clear 
picture regarding trend growth rates, since post-break growth accelerates in 
only 16 out of the 29 industries. In the remaining industries (except malt, 
leather good and shipbuilding), post-growth trend growth was still positive but 
lower than pre-break rates. This fact is consistent with the findings of Crafts 
and Mills (2004, 1994), suggesting that by mid-19th century there was a decel-
eration in some of the “leading-sector” industries of the Industrial Revolution, 
especially cotton. In contrast, both iron and steel had structural breaks in the 
late 1840s, after which there was a substantial acceleration in trend growth 
(iron from 4.8% to 7.4%, iron and steal products from 4 to 5.5%, and steel from 
1% to 4%), attesting the increasing dynamism of these industries and the influ-
ence of the railways. The increasing competitiveness of British textiles is re-
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flected by the sharp acceleration of trend growth rates in linens, rising from 1.9 
to 9% after the structural break occurred. 
Post-Break Trend Growth Rates, 1800-1850 
 
Additionally, all aggregate indexes show an acceleration in trend growth 
during the period. Since the Napoleonic Wars contributed to a reduction of 
growth rates in the first decades of the 19th century (Williamson 1984), it is 
likely that some of the acceleration in aggregate growth might be attributable to 
the post-war recovery. In this case, a break could either be a symptom of the 
increasing dynamism of the economy or simply a resumption of the pre-war 
trend. Unfortunately, the empirical evidence is not completely clear in distin-
guishing the influence of these two forces.  
In terms of the particular aggregate indexes, consumer goods had a break in 
1846, which induced an acceleration of trend growth from 3% to 4.5%. The 
break in producer goods took place in 1807, and trend growth accelerated from 
2.5% to 4%. Both aggregate industrial output indexes undergo structural breaks 
in the first decades of the 19th century, after which trend growth accelerates to 
around 3%. The similar magnitude of the structural breaks in trend growth for 
both indices is not surprising, since the differences in the weighting of the 
individual series in the aggregate index are less perceptible than in the 1750-
1800 period. Other industries, such as flour production also experienced a 
substantial rise in their post-break trend growth rates (from 2 to 7.4%). 
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Table 3: SupWald values and Break years (1800-1850) 
 
 
Break 
Year 
Model Sup-
Wald 
Sig-
nific. 
Pre-break 
trend 
growth 
Post-break 
trend 
growth 
Beer 1830 I 66.58 1% 0.4 0.2 
Breads and 
cakes 
1820 I 25.61 1%* 
2 2.3 
Building 1804 I 686.8 1% 3.2 1.8 
Coal 1836 I 31.33 5% 2.2 4 
Copper 1831 I 50.46 1% 2.7 0.4 
Cotton yarn 1846 I 86.85 1% 5.8 2.7 
Cotton goods 1844 I 41.49 1% 5 1.4 
Flour 1820 I 35.97 1% 2 7.4 
Iron  
(Feinstein) 
 
1844 
 
I 
 
42.36 
 
1% 4.8 7.4 
Iron and steel 
products 
1833 II 120.23 1% 
 
4 
 
5.5 
 
Pig Iron 
(Hoffmann) 
1847 I 31.92 5% 5 
 
3.3 
 
Hemp prod-
ucts 
1821 I 23.13 1%* -1.4 
 
2.3 
 
Leather 1840 I 28.53 10% 1.9 0.9 
Leather 
goods 
1840 I 31.22 10% 1.9 
 
- 0.2 
 
Linen yarn 1845 I 25.11 1%* 1.6 2.2 
Linens 1847 III 14.38 1% 1.9 9 
Malt 1830 III 35.49 5% 0.9 -0.04 
Paper 1830 II 75.1 1% 2.5 3.7 
Shipbuilding 1836 I 30.17 10% 1.7 -2.3 
Ocean 
shipping 
1823 I 41.68 1% -1.5 
 
4.5 
 
Silk goods 1823 II 23.6 10% 1.5 3.3 
Silk thread 1836 I 41.98 1% 5.7 2.1 
Spirits 1823 I 32.43 5% 0.6 0.63 
Steel 1847 I 29.35 10% 1 4 
Sugar 1844 II 29.63 5% 4.6 3.3 
Tin 1822 I 28.43 10% 1.4 1.8 
Tobacco 1813 I 30.81 10% 0.8 1.5 
Woolen 
cloth 
1806 III 50.66 1% 2 
 
1.5 
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Table 3 continued… 
Woolen yarn 1821 II 34.18 1% 0.95 1.65 
Aggregate 
indexes  
Consumer 
goods 
1846 I 38.59 1% 3 
 
4.5 
 
Producer 
goods 
1841 II 38.19 1% 2.5 
 
4 
 
Total Industry 
(Hoffmann) 
1813 I 188.44 1% 2.3 
 
3.2 
 
Total Industry 
Crafts+Harley 
1822 II 3.1 1% 2 
 
3.4 
 
Miscellane-
ous Variables  
Bankruptcies 1825 I 25.91 1%** 1.6 -0.05 
Patents 
(Hoffmann) 1841 
II 36.77 1% 2 
 
3.2 
 
Patents 
(MacLeod) 
1837 I 30.31 5% 2.5 
 
3.1 
 
Exports 1818 I 31.4 5% 0.8 2.1 
Imports 1834 II 36.8 1% -0.02 2 
* refers to stationary critical values 
 
In turn, a small structural break in bankruptcies occurred in 1825, which 
probably can be explained by the financial crisis as well as by the minor 
changes in the British bankruptcy laws that occurred in that year11. Bankrupt-
cies trend growth rates become slightly negative throughout the rest of the 
period. Patents underwent a structural break in 1837, after which trend growth 
rates slightly declined from 2.5% to 1.9%. This structural break might have 
been a consequence of the minor reform in patent law that took place in 1835 
(Macleod 1988). The trade variables also show an acceleration in trend growth 
rates. Total exports had a structural break at the end of the Napoleonic Wars 
and trend growth accelerated from 0.8% to 2.1%. Total imports underwent a 
structural break in 1834, after which trend growth rates increased to 2%. For 
most of these series, trend growth rates decelerate after the structural break 
occurred.  
                                                             
11  Since the Bubble Act of 1720 until 1861, most businesses in Britain operated under the 
principle of unlimited liability, which implied that “the failure of a company could be the 
ruin of its shareholders” (Weiss 1986, p. 33). Although seen as one of the cornerstones of 
British industrial success, the principle of unlimited liability complicated the raising of in-
vestment capital. Several changes in the bankruptcy laws (in 1810, 1825, 1861, and 1869) 
gradually removed the unlimited liability principle. 
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All in all, the findings of the Vogelsang structural break tests for the 1800-
1850 confirm the increasing vitality of the British economy during the Indus-
trial Revolution, corroborating the historical evidence that, by the early nine-
teenth century, the dynamism of the leading sectors was spreading across most 
industrial sectors. Although the influence of the Napoleonic Wars somewhat 
confuses matters, it is likely that most of the trend accelerations are related to 
the increasing dynamism of the British economy as previous empirical studies 
have found. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
The results from the Vogelsang structural breaks tests indicate that the Indus-
trial Revolution was a period in which there were widespread structural 
changes and pervasive growth throughout the British industrial sector. These 
findings support the view that the Industrial Revolution can be characterized as 
a discontinuity in the process of British economic development, even though 
GDP growth during the period was sluggish by today’s standards. In addition, 
the results of the Vogelsang tests show that during the early Industrial Revolu-
tion the highest post-break trend growth rates occurred in the iron and cotton 
industries as well as in the sugar industry. However, the breaks were not con-
fined to the most dynamic sectors, and hence growth was not localized. These 
findings seem to provide additional support to the view12 that the cotton and 
iron industries were the leading sectors of the British industrial sector, although 
they were by no means the only growth-enhancing industries of the period. All 
in all, the Vogelsang tests indicate that, during the early Industrial Revolution, 
structural changes were pervasive and the British economy became increas-
ingly more dynamic.  
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